

HEIDELBERG, APRIL 2023

# ABB i-bus® KNX - IP Router IPR/S and IP Interface IPS/S

**Building Academy Smart Buildings** 

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# **Agenda**

Introduction

ABB i-bus® KNX - IP devices

IP Switches IS/S and ISP/S

IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

KNX Secure Standard "KNXnet/IP Security"

ABB i-bus® Tool for diagnostics and commissioning

Tips & Tricks




#### Motivation of ABB i-bus® KNX for IP connection

- Connection of other Building Automation protocols like BACnet
- Accessing ABB i-bus® KNX remotely e.g. via Busch-ControlTouch® App
- Connection of pure IP based KNX devices like IP touch panel
- Remote programming
- To achieve a secured backbone (KNX IP secure)
- To energize devices via PoE
- To access KNX devices like Application Controller AC/S 1.x.1 via Browser for operation
- Simplification and enhancement of KNX topology with IP Router instead of Line- and Area Couplers
- **–** ...
  - → ABB i-bus® KNX is not a complete solution without IP connectivity





### ABB i-bus® KNX – Product Range Overview





### History of ABB i-bus® KNX IP Interfaces and IP Routers

- 2004: IP Gateway IG/S1.1
  - iETS2 Version 1.3
  - Multicast IP address 239.192.39.238
- 2008: IP Router IPR/S2.1
  - ETS 3.0f
  - KNXnet/IP protocol "Tunneling" and "Routing"
- 2009: IP Interface IPS/S2.1
  - ETS 3.0f
  - KNXnet/IP protocol "Tunneling"



IP Gateway IG/S 1.1



IP Router IPR/S 2.1



IP Interface IPS/S 2.1



### Overview of ABB i-bus® KNX IP Interfaces and IP Routers

Devices using the KNXnet/IP protocol (standard) for the communication

- IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 standard (2015 to present)
- IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 standard (2015 to present)

Devices using the KNXnet/IP **Secure** protocol for the communication

- IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1 (2019 to present)
- IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 (2021 to present)



IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1



**IP Router** IPR/S 3.1.1



IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1



**IP Router** Secure IPR/S 3.5.1







ABB IP Switches IS/S 8.1.1 and ISP/S 8.1.1.1

ABB IP Switches IS/S 8.1.1 and ISP/S 8.1.1.1

#### Introduction

- The IP infrastructure plays an important role in the reliability and availability of all building functions
- The increasing dependence on IP infrastructures for the reliability and availability of the building functionality plays a key factor in the design of the IP infrastructure
- Building Automation market is increasingly including IP connections on the field level
- Additionally, the use of PoE technology in field level devices is rising, e.g. ABB i-bus® KNX IP Router or IP Interface
- Separate technical IP infrastructures or networks are becoming more common place in buildings





ABB IP Switches IS/S 8.1.1 and ISP/S 8.1.1.1

#### **Overview**

- The ABB IP Switches are two
  - Industrial quality standard
  - 8 Ports
  - fast Ethernet (100 Mbit/s)
  - unmanaged

switches (with and without PoE) designed for installation in electrical distribution boards and rapid mounting on DIN-Rails








ABB IP Switches IS/S 8.1.1 and ISP/S 8.1.1.1

#### **Overview**






# ABB IP Switches IS/S 8.1.1 and ISP/S 8.1.1.1

#### ABB i-bus® KNX

- IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1\* and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1\*
- IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1\* and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1\*
- Logic Controller ABA/S 1.2.1\*
- ABB EQmatic Energy Analyzer QA/S x.xx.1
- ClimaECO Application Controller AC/S 1.x.1
- KNX Security Panel GM/A 8.1
- Busch-ControlTouch® CT/S 2.1
- Busch-VoiceControl® VCO/S 150.2
- IP touch 7 / 10 LAN\*
- PLC AC500 with KNX communication (former BAC/S)
- **..**.

#### \* Data and PoE



Simplifying IP connectivity in your KNX installation



### ABB IP Switches IS/S 8.1.1 and ISP/S 8.1.1.1

#### **General information**

- The IP Switches
  - are designed for the special requirements of building automation
  - meets the relevant industry standards, provides very high operational reliability, even under extreme conditions and also long-term reliability and flexibility
  - are designed for installation in electrical distribution boards and small housings for rapid mounting on a 35 mm mounting rail in accordance with EN 60715

Product name	Туре	Order Code
IP Switch	IS/S 8.1.1	2CDG120082R0011
IP Switch-PoE	ISP/S 8.1.1.1	2CDG120083R0011







ABB IP Switches IS/S 8.1.1 and ISP/S 8.1.1.1

### **Key Characteristics IP Switch IS/S 8.1.1**






ABB IP Switches IS/S 8.1.1 and ISP/S 8.1.1.1

### **Key Characteristics IP Switch ISP/S 8.1.1.1**






ABB IP Switches IS/S 8.1.1 and ISP/S 8.1.1.1

### IP Switch ISP/S 8.1.1.1: Support of PoE

- The device supports Power over Ethernet (PoE) in accordance with IEEE 802.3af
- The Power over Ethernet function is activated on the PoE ports on delivery
- The devices are supplied with PoE voltage via the internal voltage supply
- The PoE voltage to the twisted-pair cables is supplied via the wire pairs transmitting the signal (phantom voltage)
- The PoE voltage is decoupled from the power supply
- The individual ports are not electrically insulated from each other
- Ensure that the device does not exceed the specified maximum PoE power output → For the maximum power available to PoE end devices in total, see the technical data







ABB IP Switches IS/S 8.1.1 and ISP/S 8.1.1.1

### IP Switch ISP/S 8.1.1.1: Support of PoE

- ABB i-bus® KNX devices that can be supplied via PoE
- PoE IEEE 802.3af class 1 (3.84 W)
  - IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1
  - IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1
  - IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1
  - IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 → Power loss of a max. of 1.8 W
- PoE IEEE 802.3af class 2 (6.5 W)
  - Logic Controller ABA/S 1.2.1 → Power loss of a max. of 3 W
  - IP touch H8236/H8237
- Note on IP Router IPR/S and IP Interface IPS/S:
   If PoE and supply voltage are connected at the same time, PoE is used






### ABB IP Switches IS/S 8.1.1 and ISP/S 8.1.1.1

### Homepage

### www.abb.com/KNX

- → Products and Downloads
  - → System Infrastructure and Interfacing
     → IP Infrastructure Components
- Product Manual
- Technical Data
- Operating instruction
- Engineering Guides
- Installation and Operating Instruction
- Specification Text
- ...






IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

#### Interfaces - IP and USB

- An Interface enables communication between ETS and a KNX system (programming, bus monitoring, group monitoring, diagnostic tools, ...)
- Visualization systems, ABB i-bus® Tool, or other clients, can also use the interface to access KNX
- USB Interface USB/S
  - Communication between USB and TP
- IP Interface IPS/S
  - Communication between LAN and TP
  - 5 Tunneling Server
    - → Built in 5-fold "USB Interface" via LAN






IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### **KNX IP Interface – Principle**

- An ABB i-bus® KNX IP Interface connects the KNX TP bus to an Ethernet network
- KNX telegrams can be sent to or received from other devices via the Ethernet network
- The IP Interface can be used as a programming interface (ETS) and clients, e.g. visualizations or tablet/smart phone with App via Wi-Fi, can access the KNX bus via the IP Interface
  - IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard KNXnet/IP protocol)
  - IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1
     This device uses the KNXnet/IP protocol and the KNXnet/IP Security protocol from the KNX Association (tunneling) for communication
- Not for connection of KNX lines and areas over IP
   (no routing of KNX telegrams) → KNX IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard)

### **KNXnet/IP Capabilities:**

- Tunneling (Interface)
  - 5 Tunneling Server
  - To connect a PC to KNX via IP
    - Working with ETS (download, diagnostics,...)
    - ABB i-bus® Tool support
    - Visualisation
    - Tablet/Smart Phone with App via Wi-Fi

- ..





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard)

- Hardware
  - Network cable connection
  - Labelling field
  - DIN rail connection
  - Cover cap
  - Programming button and LED
- Power supply
  - 12 ... 30 V DC (e.g. separate Power Supply CP-D or NTU/S)
  - Power over Ethernet (PoE):IEEE 802.3af class 1
  - If PoE and supply voltage are connected at the same time, PoE is used





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard)

#### LED "ON"


- After the supply voltage  $U_s$  is connected, the LED initially lights up continuously
- After approx. 40 sec., the LED starts flashing until initialization is completed

#### LED "LAN/LINK"

- Once initialization is completed, the LED lights up when the IP Interface is connected to an IP network
- The LED flashes when the device detects activity on the IP network, e.g. when data is exchanged

### LED "Telegram"

- The LED lights up continuously when the IP Interface is connected to KNX after the startup process is completed
- The LED flashes when the device detects activity on the KNX subline TP (twisted pair)






IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard)

- 1. Label carrier
- 2. KNX programming LED (red)
- 3. KNX programming button
- 4. KNX bus connection terminal
- 5. Cover cap
- 6. Power supply connection  $U_s$
- 7. Telegram LED (yellow)
- 8. LAN/LINK LED (yellow)
- 9. ON LED (green)
- 10. LAN connection







IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard)

#### Supplied state


- The device is supplied with the individual address 15.15.255
- All five tunneling connection addresses are set to 15.15.100 (only one tunnel is visible to the outside)
- In ETS, the first five free addresses in the line are assigned automatically after the IP Interface has been inserted into a line
- The IP address is set to automatic IP assignment (DHCP/AutoIP)
- The tunneling connection addresses set in the ETS will be adopted only after the first download
- The parametrized settings will be adopted after the first download








IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1






IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1




Connection "KNXnet/IP <u>Tunneling</u>": Unicast (Point to Point) ETS: Group and bus monitor are supported

1.1.255 Individual address of IPS/S
5 Tunneling Server e.g. 1.1.250 − 1.1.254:
→ 5 additional addresses (local) for the tunneling server of the IP Interface



IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) - Setting up a tunnel connection in the ETS




Automatic IP assignment (DHCP/AutoIP) or static/fixed IP address

MAC address (will be displayed after the first download)



IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1


### IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) - Setting up a tunnel connection in the ETS





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1


### IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) - Setting up a tunnel connection in the ABB i-bus® Tool





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) - ABB i-bus® Tool: "Discovery" (find and display ABB IP devices in the network)





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

#### **KNX IP Secure**

### **Bus safety**

- Residential and functional buildings have been equipped with intelligent bus technology for 30 years
- Increasing opening towards the Internet and smart devices
- This increases comfort, safety and efficiency, but also the risk of attacks on the building infrastructure
- Buildings cannot be made absolutely secure, but the effort of an attack can be increased and the impact limited locally
- There are technical, organizational and planning aspects to be considered
- The most relevant attack scenario on a KNX installation is over the IP network





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

#### **KNX IP Secure**

#### **General measures**

Cybersecurity must be an integral part of planning and execution in a facility

Already it is possible to make access via IP (relatively) secure


- To the outside (firewall, VPN, filtering MAC addresses)
- Inside (separate technical IP network, encryption with Wi-Fi)

Prevent physical access to the KNX bus

- Lockable distribution boards
- Devices with dismantling protection
- Separate lines for sensitive areas
- No KNX cable outside the building

**–** ..

→ Access-protected installation of the KNX IP Secure devices





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

#### **KNX IP Secure**

KNX Secure has been developed to respond to the current and future challenges regarding cyber security in building automation

- Step 1: Securing the IP communication with "KNX IP Secure"
  - Implementation of the KNX IP Secure Standard in routers, interfaces and other IP devices
  - Software clients (visualizations) are also affected
- Step 2: Implementation of "KNX Data Secure" in all field devices






IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1


### **KNX IP Secure (KNXnet/IP Secure Routing and Tunneling)**

- TP Telegrams are wrapped in a secure frame on IP
- Tunneling connections are secure
- All IP devices in a project have to speak secure



#### **KNX Data Secure**

- Each individual group telegram can be encrypted
- Communication between sensors and actuators is secure
- Data Secure is available for the medium TP and RF







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
#### **KNX Secure Brochures of the KNX Association**

- KNX Secure Checklist
- KNX Secure Guide
- KNX Secure Products
- https://knxsecure.knx.org











IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

# The ABB IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 has the <u>same properties</u> as the IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 standard

- 5 Tunneling Servers
  - → parallel access, less hardware
- Power over Ethernet (PoE)
  - → no additional power supply or 12...30 V DC
- ABB i-bus® Tool support
  - $\rightarrow$  easier commissioning and diagnostics





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

#### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

# The ABB IP Interface Secure is a KNX device according to the KNX Secure Standard "KNXnet/IP Security"

- The communication on the IP network is secure
  - → All KNX IP Secure devices must support the KNXnet/IP security protocol
- ETS6 or ETS5 (5.7.4 or higher), the current version of the device application and firmware are required for programming
- The device should always be operated in KNX Secure mode
   This ensures security for the tunneling servers
- The device can be safely put into operation
- All five tunnel connections can be used together encrypted or unencrypted
- Firmware update with ABB i-bus® Tool, available updates should be loaded into the device promptly







IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

#### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

#### **Connection "KNXnet/IP Tunneling Secure":**

Unicast (Point to Point)

ETS: Group and bus monitor are supported


1.4.255 Individual address IP Interface

Tunneling Server e.g. 1.4.250 – 1.4.254:

→ 5 additional addresses (local) for the tunneling server of the IP Interface



IPS/S3.5.1






IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 – Areas of application

- If the existing five tunneling connections are not sufficient of an IP Router IPR/S
- Existing KNX installations with Area/Line Couplers LK/S should be connected via IP
- Connection to IP of new installations that only consist of one line, for example a residential home
- No IP Routers IPR/S are installed and a central system (BMS server, visualization system, hotel management system)
   establishes a connection to each individual IP Interface IPS/S via the integrated tunneling server, e.g. in a hotel
  - Secure tunneling connection from each room to central BMS
  - Security by isolated rooms
  - It covers the use case "attack" from the field level
  - No direct inter-room communication available
  - BMS can also monitor the KNX field devices






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


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#### Tunneling connections to each main line $\rightarrow$ less bus traffic on backbone line






IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 – Areas of application

- If the existing five tunneling connections are not sufficient of an IP Router IPR/S
- Existing KNX installations with Area/Line Couplers LK/S should be connected via IP
- Connection to IP of new installations that only consist of one line, for example a residential home
- No IP Routers IPR/S are installed and a central system (BMS server, visualization system, hotel management system)
   establishes a connection to each individual IP Interface IPS/S via the integrated tunneling server, e.g. in a hotel
  - Secure tunneling connection from each room to central BMS
  - Security by isolated rooms
  - It covers the use case "attack" from the field level
  - No direct inter-room communication available
  - BMS can also monitor the KNX field devices






IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

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IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 - Commissioning

- When commissioning a KNX secure device (first download) a commissioning key – "Device Certificate" – is required
- The "Device Certificate" consists of
  - FDSK = Factory Default Setup Key
  - Serial number of IP Secure device
- ABB secure devices:
   The "Device Certificate" is placed on a sticker on the left side of the device and must be imported into the ETS
- One sticker can be used for project documentation, the other can be left on the device







IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

#### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 - Commissioning

- The FDSK is only required for initial commissioning
- After that, the ETS creates new "Tool Keys"
- The "Tool Keys" are transferred via the bus with encryption based on FDSK to the IP Interface
- Further device configuration is encrypted based on the "Tool Key"
- The FDSK is only needed again after a device reset to factory settings








IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 - Commissioning

How to enter the "Device Certificate"?

- When inserting a KNX Secure device, you will be asked for it
- The ETS asks for the key when programming for the first time
- Click on "Add Device Certificate"
  - Properties → Settings → Selected device
  - ETS main menu "Security"
- The reading can be done offline
- The keys are assigned automatically to the IP Interface Secure by ETS






IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 - Commissioning

How to enter the "Device Certificate"?

- The key can be
  - Entered via the keyboard
  - · Read in with a QR code scanner
  - Read with the webcam of laptop






IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 - Commissioning

- The ETS generates separate passwords for each tunneling server
- The passwords of the tunneling server can be changed if necessary
- A tunnel address can be passed to a client (e.g. BMS or Visu) with the password
- The keys are generated and managed by the ETS
- If necessary, keys and passwords can be exported






IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

#### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 - Commissioning

First download of IP Interface Secure

- The IP Interface is in the delivery state (e.g. after a factory reset)
- The device is connected to KNX TP (twisted pair)
- The individual address and application program can be downloaded in different ways
  - Another programming interface which supports KNX "long frame" telegrams (APDU > 15)
    - USB Interface USB/S 1.2
    - IP Router IPR/S via KNXnet/IP Routing or KNXnet/IP Tunneling
  - Itself with one of the integrated tunneling servers








IP Interface IPS/S 3.5.1





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 – Setting up a tunnel connection in the ETS



Automatic IP assignment (DHCP/AutoIP) or static/fixed IP address

MAC address (will be displayed after the first download)


Commissioning password (can be adopted like this)

Authentication code (can be adopted like this)



IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1


### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 – Setting up a tunnel connection in the ETS





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 – ABB i-bus® Tool: "Discovery" (find and display ABB IP devices in the network)





IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

#### IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

#### **Summary**

- KNX IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1 fulfills the KNX Secure Standard "KNXnet/IP Security"
- Communication from ETS and tunneling servers are secure
- After commissioning, an IP Interface Secure behaves like a standard IP Interface
- All functions from standard IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 are available
- The ETS requests a password for the project
- The "Device Certificates" of all IP Interfaces Secure and other IP devices Secure must be entered
- The ETS generates and works with many keys but there is no need to change them
- Access-protected installation of the KNX IP Secure devices








IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### Coupler - IP and TP (twisted pair)

- A coupler is used in larger installations to connect KNX lines or areas
- Telegrams can be filtered to simultaneously reduce the telegram traffic between lines or areas
- Line Coupler LK/S
  - Communication between TP main/backbone line and TP subline
- IP Router IPR/S
  - Communication between LAN and TP subline
     The KNXnet/IP protocol is used for communication
  - 5 additional Tunneling Server for programming with ETS and further clients
    - → Built in 5-fold "USB Interface" via LAN






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### **KNX IP Router – Principle**

- An ABB i-bus® KNX IP Router connects the KNX TP bus to an Ethernet network
- KNX telegrams can be sent to or received from other devices via the Ethernet network → routing of KNX telegrams
- This allows data exchange between KNX and IP networks
- The IP Router can be used as a <u>Line Coupler</u> or <u>Area Coupler</u> and complies with the specifications of the KNXnet/IP standard
  - IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard KNXnet/IP protocol)
  - IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1
     This device uses the KNXnet/IP protocol and the KNXnet/IP Security protocol from the KNX Association (routing and tunneling) for communication
- Furthermore, the 5 tunneling server can be used in parallel for working with the ETS, access from the ABB i-bus® Tool, connection to a visualization, etc.





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard)

#### **KNXnet/IP Capabilities:**

- Routing (Coupler)
  - Connection of KNX Lines and Areas over IP network
  - Routing of KNX telegrams
- <u>Tunneling</u> (Interface)
  - 5 Tunneling Server
  - To connect a PC to KNX via IP
    - Working with ETS (download, diagnostics,...)
    - ABB i-bus® Tool support
    - Visualisation
    - Tablet/Smart Phone with App via Wi-Fi

- ...





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard)

- Default multicast IP address 224.0.23.12 and port 3671 for communication on IP network according to the KNXnet/IP routing protocol
- Unicast communication possible with up to 10 IPR/S 3.1.1 (not according to the KNXnet/IP standard)
- ETS parameter from KNX to LAN and LAN to KNX
  - "Filter", "Route" or "Block" for all main groups 0...31 or group addresses 1...65,535 with free group address view
  - "Filter" or "Block" of physically addressed telegrams (e.g. download of application program, diagnostic)
  - "Route" or "Block" of broadcast telegrams
     (e.g. download of individual program, diagnostic)






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### KNX telegrams in the network – Multicast

- Multicast designates communication of a transmitter with a group of receivers → Point to Multipoint
- The IP Router sends the KNX telegrams packaged as UDP/IP telegrams on the IP network, and all IP Router devices parameterized with the same multicast address receive and evaluate these telegrams
- If a telegram is intended for the corresponding subline, the IP
   Router routes the telegram into the line otherwise, it is rejected
- The IP Router sends telegrams from the KNX to the IP network in accordance with the KNXnet/IP protocol specification
- This multicast IP address 224.0.23.12 port 3671 is the defined address for the KNXnet/IP from the KNX Association in conjunction with IANA for KNX IP devices
- In order for several IP Router devices to communicate with one another in a network, multicast communication must be possible between the devices (e.g. routers, switches or firewalls)





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### **Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)**

The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is responsible for the global coordination of the Domain Names, IP addressing, and other Internet protocol resources

- Internet Protocol v4 Multicast Address Assignments
- AD-HOC Block (224.0.2.0 224.0.255.0)

Address(s) Description References


• 224.0.23.10 Telefeed

• 224.0.23.11 SpectraTalk

• 224.0.23.12 KNXnet/IP (EIBnet/IP)

• 224.0.23.13 TVE-ANNOUNCE2

• 224.0.23.14 DvbServDisc





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard)

- Hardware
  - Network cable connection
  - Labelling field
  - DIN rail connection
  - Cover cap
  - Programming button and LED
- Power supply
  - 12 ... 30 V DC (e.g. separate Power Supply CP-D or NTU/S)
  - Power over Ethernet (PoE):IEEE 802.3af class 1
  - If PoE and supply voltage are connected at the same time, PoE is used





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard)

#### LED "ON"

- After the supply voltage  $U_s$  is connected, the LED initially lights up continuously
- After approx. 40 sec., the LED starts flashing until initialization is completed

#### LED "LAN/LINK"

- Once initialization is completed, the LED lights up when the IP Interface is connected to an IP network
- The LED flashes when the device detects activity on the IP network, e.g. when data is exchanged

#### LED "Telegram"

- The LED lights up continuously when the IP Interface is connected to KNX after the startup process is completed
- The LED flashes when the device detects activity on the KNX subline TP (twisted pair)












IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard)

- 1. Label carrier
- 2. KNX programming LED (red)
- 3. KNX programming button
- 4. KNX bus connection terminal
- 5. Cover cap
- 6. Power supply connection U<sub>s</sub>
- 7. Telegram LED (yellow)
- 8. LAN/LINK LED (yellow)
- 9. ON LED (green)
- 10. LAN connection






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard)

#### Supplied state


- The device is supplied with the individual address 15.15.0
- All tunneling connection addresses are set to 15.15.100 (only one tunnel is visible to the outside)
- The device is supplied with the option "Group telegrams -Route"
  - → This is not the default setting in the application, but it simplifies commissioning
- In ETS, the first five free addresses in the line are assigned automatically after the IP Router has been inserted into a line
- The tunneling connection addresses set in the ETS will be adopted only after the first download
- The IP address is set to automatic IP assignment (DHCP/AutoIP)
- The parametrized settings will be adopted after the first download





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard)



Automatic IP assignment (DHCP/AutoIP) or static/fixed IP address


MAC address (will be displayed after the first download)

Multicast address 224.0.23.12



IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) – ETS Parameter "KNX → LAN"




Name of the IP Router is downloaded into the device



IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1


#### IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) – ETS Parameter "LAN → KNX"





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) – ETS Parameter "IP Settings"



Unicast Communication
→ Solution if Multicast
is not possible
(a group of max. 10 IP
Router)




IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) – ETS "Preview Filter Table"

Filter table (group addresses) is calculated automatically by the ETS


The filter table can be displayed by right-clicking on the IP Router





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1


### **Topology with TP Area and Line Couplers LK/S**





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1


### **Topology with TP Area and Line Couplers LK/S**





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1


### Topology with IP Router IPR/S as Area Coupler and TP Line Couplers LK/S





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1


### Topology with IP Router IPR/S as Area Coupler and TP Line Couplers LK/S





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1


### Topology only with IP Router IPR/S as Line Coupler – no Area Couplers!





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1


### Topology only with IP Router IPR/S as Line Coupler – no Area Couplers!





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1


### Mixed Topology with IP Router IPR/S as Area Coupler and Line Couplers





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router: Routing → Coupler






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router: Routing → Interface


- Additional routing interface "KNXnet/IP Routing"
  - Working with ETS (download, diagnostics,...)
  - Access from the ABB i-bus® Tool
  - Connection to a visualization, etc.
- Communication via IP network!
  - → Sending and receiving of KNXnet/IP multicast telegrams on the network
- Note: Filter table of IPR/S
  - → Recommendation: Use of tunneling server instead of routing interface





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router: Routing → Interface – Setting up a routing connection in the ETS






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### **IP Router: Tunneling** → **Interface**

- Furthermore, the 5 tunneling server can be used <u>in parallel</u> for
  - Working with ETS (download, diagnostics, group and bus monitoring, ...)
  - Access from the ABB i-bus® Tool
  - Connection to a visualization, etc.
  - →Built in "IP Interface IPS/S"
- Setting up a tunnel connection in the ETS:
   See chapter "IP Interface IPS/S"






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router: Tunneling → Interface

- Furthermore, the 5 tunneling server can be used in parallel for
  - Working with ETS (download, diagnostics, group and bus monitoring, ...)
  - Access from the ABB i-bus® Tool
  - Connection to a visualization, etc.
- A tunnel connection must be created in the ETS, ABB i-bus® Tool, visualization for each IP Router IPR/S, e.g.
  - Tunnel connection to line 1.1.xxx via tunneling server 1.1.251 of IPR/S 1.1.0
  - Tunnel connection to line 4.3.xxx via tunneling server 4.3.251 of IPR/S 4.3.0
  - Tunnel connection to line 8.1.xxx via tunneling server 8.1.251 of IPR/S 8.1.0
  - Tunnel connection to line ...



Each IP Router works **simultaneously** as a coupler (KNXnet/IP Routing) and interface (KNXnet/IP Tunneling).




IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### **Situation**

- The most relevant attack scenario on a KNX installation is over the IP network
- But access over TP is of course also possible and relevant for Building Automation





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### Threat scenarios


#### IP network

- Local (Wi-Fi/LAN)
  - Often no separate technical network; therefore, users have direct access to IP communication
- Remote access / Internet:
  - Network Routers are often "open" visible on the Internet
  - High number of potential attackers

#### **Fieldbus**

- Private housing
  - KNX cable outside the building
- Commercial buildings
  - Access to the bus via any node (especially in the hotel)







IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### **Attack types (examples)**

Denial of Service Attack (DOS)

 Telegram flood on KNX (IP) device, as a result the device is temporarily unavailable

Doing unwanted functions

- Driving blinds, switching lights, ...

Sabotage

- Change set points, reprogram devices, short circuit bus

Espionage

Spying on user profiles

Deceive, intrusion

- Opening a door, disabling/unset security systems

#### **Impacts**

Possible impacts

- Image damage (manufacturer, system integrator, end customer)
- Data loss
- Reduction of comfort
- Security loss
- Economic damage
- → There are already ways to prevent / significantly hinder access to the system
- → Due to the current enhancements of the KNX standard ("KNX Secure"), additional security mechanisms are possible
- → KNX Secure alone does not make the system secure!



IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### The "entire chain" must be taken into account

#### Manufacturer

- (Product) security standards (cyber security, robustness), updates
- Specification of standards (KNX Secure)
- Provision of checklists, training, ...

System integrator, installer

- Safety concept for planning, installation and operation
- Risk analysis

End customer, operator of the building

- Access control, security concept
- IT security (current security settings ...)











IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### **General measures**

Cybersecurity must be an integral part of planning and execution a facility


Already it is possible to make access via IP (relatively) secure

- To the outside (firewall, VPN, filtering MAC addresses)
- Inside (separate technical IP network, encryption with Wi-Fi)

Prevent physical access to the bus

- Lockable distribution boards
- Devices with dismantling protection
- Separate lines for sensitive areas
- No KNX cable outside the building

**–** ..






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### Special solution for the attack scenario from the field level

- Standard IP Interfaces connect hotel rooms with a central system (BMS Server)
- Tunneling connection from each room to central BMS
- Security by isolated rooms no KNX Secure!
- It covers the use case "Attack" from the field level
- No direct inter-room communication available
- BMS can also monitor the KNX field devices
- → ABB "Hotel IP Link Bundle" HIL/S 20.1.1






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### Special solution for the attack scenario from the field level

#### ABB "Hotel IP Link Bundle" HIL/S 20.1.1

- The Hotel IP Link Bundle is consisting of a KNX IP Interface (IPS/S) and a KNX Power Supply (SV/S)
- The IPS/S supports the KNXnet/IP protocol (tunneling) from the KNX Association
- A central system (BMS server, visualization system, hotel management system) establishes a connection to each individual IP Interface IPS/S via the integrated tunneling server
- The SV/S generates and monitors the KNX system voltage for up to 20 KNX TP (twisted pair) devices via an integrated choke
- The additional 30 V DC voltage output is used to power the IPS/S 2.1
- Order number: 2CDG110237R0011



IP Link Bundle HIL/S 20.1.1



IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### **Measure KNX Secure**

KNX Secure has been developed to respond to the current and future challenges regarding cyber security in building automation

- Step 1: Securing the IP communication with "KNX IP Secure"
  - Implementation of the KNX IP Secure Standard in IP Routers, Interfaces and other IP devices
  - Software clients (visualizations) are also affected
- Step 2: Implementation of "KNX Data Secure" in all field devices





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### **KNX Secure offers maximum protection**

- Home and building automation with KNX is secure
- KNX Secure guarantees maximum protection
  - KNX IP Secure extends the IP protocol in such a way that all transferred telegrams and data are completely encrypted
  - KNX Data Secure effectively protects user data against unauthorized access and manipulation
- The KNX technology is standardized according to EN 50090-4-3, which means that KNX successfully blocks hacker attacks on the digital infrastructure of networked buildings
- Thus minimizing the risk of digital break-ins
- Moreover, KNX Secure meets the highest encryption standards (according to ISO 18033-3, such as AES 128 CCM encryption) in order to effectively prevent attacks on the digital infrastructure of buildings and to achieve the highest level of data protection






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1


#### **KNX Secure Brochures of the KNX Association**

- KNX Secure Checklist
- KNX Secure Guide
- KNX Secure Products
- https://knxsecure.knx.org











IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### **Conclusion**

- There is no 100% security
- Manufacturers, KNX Association, associations and the system integrators are pushing the issue of safety to make the building (even) safer
- Safety, comfort and economy have to be balanced against each other
- In each project, it must be weighted how much security is necessary
- The entire lifecycle of a building must be taken into account
- Integrators with the appropriate know-how have a competitive advantage and should use it



Elbphilharmonie (Hamburg)
Concert hall/Stadiums and recreation



IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### **IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1**

The ABB IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1 has the <u>same properties</u> (ETS parameter, filter table, ...) as the IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 standard

- Routing of telegrams
  - → connection of KNX Lines and Areas over IP network
- Support of full filter table for all main groups 0...31
  - → no restrictions for usage of the extended group address range
- Power over Ethernet (PoE)
  - → no additional power supply or 12...30 V DC
- ABB i-bus® Tool support
  - → easier commissioning and diagnostics
- Unicast communication
  - → solution if Multicast is not possible
- 5 Tunneling Servers
  - → parallel access, less hardware







IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### **IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1**

# The ABB IP Router Secure is a KNX device according to the KNX Secure Standard (KNXnet/IP Security)

- The communication on the IP network is secure
  - → All KNX IP Secure devices must support the KNXnet/IP security protocol
- ETS6 or ETS5 (5.7.4 or higher), the current version of the device application and firmware are required for programming
- The device should always be operated in KNX Secure mode
   This ensures security for the tunneling servers
- The device can be safely put into operation
- All five tunnel connections can be used together encrypted or unencrypted
- Firmware update with ABB i-bus® Tool, available updates should be loaded into the device promptly








IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### KNX IP Secure (KNXnet/IP Secure Routing and Tunneling)

- TP Telegrams are wrapped in a secure frame on IP
- Tunneling connections are secure
- All IP devices in a project have to speak secure





IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1 – Commissioning

- When commissioning a KNX secure device (first download) a commissioning key – "Device Certificate" – is required
- The "Device Certificate" consists of
  - FDSK = Factory Default Setup Key
  - Serial number of IP Secure device
- ABB secure devices:
   The "Device Certificate" is placed on a sticker on the left side of the device and must be imported into the ETS
- One sticker can be used for project documentation, the other can be left on the device







IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1 – Commissioning

- The "Device Certificate" is only required for initial commissioning
- After that, the ETS creates new "Tool Keys"
- The "Tool Keys" are transferred via the bus with encryption based on FDSK to the IP Router
- Further device configuration is encrypted based on the "Tool Key"
- The FDSK is only needed again after a device reset to factory settings








IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1 – Commissioning

How to enter the "Device Certificate"?

- When inserting a KNX Secure device, you will be asked for it
- The ETS asks for the key when programming for the first time
- Click on "Add Device Certificate"
  - Properties → Settings → Selected device
  - ETS main menu "Security"
- The reading can be done offline
- The keys are assigned automatically to the IP Router Secure by ETS






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1 – Commissioning

How to enter the "Device Certificate"?

- The key can be
  - Entered via the keyboard
  - · Read in with a QR code scanner
  - Read with the webcam of laptop






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

### IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1 – Commissioning

- The ETS generates separate passwords for each tunneling server
- The passwords of the tunneling server can be changed if necessary
- A tunnel address can be passed to a client (e.g. BMS or Visu)
   with the password
- The keys are generated and managed by the ETS
- If necessary, keys and passwords can be exported







IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### Situation 1 – Attack over the IP network

#### **No IP Secure**

- Record and send KNX telegrams with ETS group monitor
- Record and analyze IP telegrams with special software,
   e.g. Wireshark








IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### Situation 1 – Attack over the IP network

**No IP Secure:** Record and analyze IP telegram with special software, e.g. Wireshark







IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### Situation 2 – Attack over the IP network

#### **IP Secure**

- The complete KNX telegram is encrypted
- An IP telegram with the same KNX group address and the same value is different for each transmission
  - → No replay attack possible!
- The ETS has assigned a "Backbone Key" for multicast communication on IP to all KNX IP Secure devices in the project








IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### Situation 2 – Attack over the IP network

IP Secure: The complete KNX telegram is encrypted







IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### Situation 3 – Attack over the IP network

#### No IP Secure

- Unload and download an IP Router with the ETS is possible








IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### Situation 4 – Attack over the IP network

#### **IP Secure**

- Unload and download an IP Router with an "Attack ETS" is not possible
  - → No "Backbone Key"!






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### Situation 5 – Attack over the IP network

#### **IP Secure**

- Replacing the IP Router Secure with an IP Router standard
- This does not pose a security risk because the device is not a part of the secure system
  - → No multicast communication to other IP Router Secure possible!!!






IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### Situation 6 - Attack over the IP network

#### **IP Secure**


- Factory reset can be done directly on the IP Router Secure
- This does not pose a security risk because the device is no longer part of the secure system
  - → No multicast communication to other IP Router Secure possible!!!
- Despite existing FDSK there is no access to the system (e.g. the sticker with the FDSK is still on the device)
- For commissioning and operation in KNX Secure mode, the "Backbone Key" and "Tool Key" is required!






IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1

## IP Router Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1 – ABB i-bus® Tool: "Discovery" (find and display ABB IP devices in the network)







IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 (standard) and IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1

#### **IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1**

#### **Summary**

- KNX IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1 fulfills the KNX Secure Standard "KNXnet/IP Security"
- Communication on IP network, tunneling servers and commissioning from ETS are secure
- After commissioning, an IP Router Secure behaves like a standard IP Router and has the same parameters
- All functions from standard IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 are available
- The ETS requests a password for the project
- The "Device Certificates" (FDSK) of all IP Routers Secure and other IP devices Secure must be entered
- The ETS generates and works with many keys but there is no need to change them









Tips & Tricks – IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

Tips & Tricks – IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1


#### No ETS access to the IP Network possible

ETS programming, diagnostics,... is **not always possible** with the IP Router IPR/S or IP Router Interface, e.g.

- The firewall, virus scanner, ... on the laptop is blocking a download
- Multicast communication (Point to Multipoint) is not possible in a network (blocked by network admin)
- External System Integrator does not have access to the company IP network

- ..

- → Always have a USB interface with you
- → So you always have access to KNX





Tips & Tricks – IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

#### Filter tables

- The filter tables of IP Router IPR/S are generated by ETS automatically in the background
- If "KNX" devices (ABB Busch-ControlTouch®, BMS, visualization, tablet apps, ...) are parameterized outside of the ETS, the ETS does not know these devices and cannot adapt the filter tables accordingly
  - → Manual editing of the tables may be necessary
  - When communicating via a tunnel server, there is a direct connection to the line → no editing of the filter tables required
  - In the case of communication via Multicast, the connection is on the IP network and the group addresses must be added to the filter tables manually



IP Router IPR/S incl. filter table



BMS, visualization,





ABB Busch-ControlTouch®




Tips & Tricks – IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

#### Filter tables - Manual editing of the filter tables (1)

#### Set the ETS parameter of IP Router IPR/S to "Route"

- All group telegrams from the main line to the line and from the line to the main line are forwarded
- The group telegrams are thus also forwarded to all other lines
- This can lead to a <u>high bus load</u> in all lines and possible communication problems
- Note:
  - If there is no acknowledge (ACK) of the group telegram, it will be repeated up to 3 times in all lines!
- → Not recommended except during initial commissioning !!!






Tips & Tricks – IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

#### Filter tables - Manual editing of the filter tables (2)

#### Add group addresses to the filter tables manually

- You can manually add group addresses by clicking on a line or area (not IP Router) in the topology window
- Then select the "Information" tab in the navigation bar
- You have the option there to add and remove group addresses
- The group addresses automatically generated by the ETS and manually added are then listed in the "Manual filter table entries" dialog window (>> right mouse click on IP Router)
- Note:
  - The filter tables of all IP Routers must be edited
  - If an address of a group address is changed, this <u>manually</u> added group address is not updated in the filter table!
- → Not really recommended!!!






Tips & Tricks – IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

### Filter tables – Manual editing of the filter tables (3)

#### **Dummy device in ETS**

- Add an additional KNX device (dummy) to the ETS and link the required group addresses
- The ETS recalculates the filter tables of all IP Routers and automatically adds these group addresses
- However, this "dummy" device only exists in the ETS
- → Recommended!!!






Tips & Tricks – IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

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


Tips & Tricks – IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

#### **Unicast Communication**

- Solution if Multicast communication is not possible
- Up to 10 IP Routers IPR/S can be combined to form a "Unicast group"
- Each IP Router IPR/S is then assigned 9 IP addresses to which it sends its telegrams (Point to Point)
- It is also possible to link a client (e.g. a visualization or BMS) with this unicast group
- Configuration of unicast groups is simple with the ABB i-bus®
   Tool
- Many Unicast groups are possible at the same time, but communication is feasible only within the same group
- Network telegrams are acknowledged and repeated if necessary


**Note:** This special communication type does not comply with the KNXnet/IP specification







Tips & Tricks – IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

## Unicast Communication - Configuration of unicast groups with the ABB i-bus® Tool








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Tips & Tricks – IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

#### Attacks from outside via the Internet

- Many KNX installations everywhere can be at risk now. It is necessary to protect this installations
  - Never open ports or using port redirection of network routers
     → This makes the KNX communication visible via the Internet
  - Using secure access via specific devices, VPN or a portal (ABB "myBuildings" portal)
- Current situation
  - In the past, remote access via the Internet was desired
  - Ports (e.g. 3671) were opened and they are <u>still open!</u>
  - KNX installations have already been "attacked" (use of open vulnerabilities) from outside and KNX devices have been reprogrammed, unloaded, ...
- → Without the right security measures your KNX project could be open to attack from automated bots




Access to KNX installations via Internet



Tips & Tricks – IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

#### Communication via IP and TP of KNX devices

- There are KNX devices with an IP connection
- However, communication takes place via twisted pair TP
- The filter tables of the IP Routers IPR/S must be observed and, if necessary, edited manually
- The IP connection is e.g. only for web access with a browser
  - Logic Controller ABA/S
  - ABB EQmatic Energy Analyzer QA/S KNX
  - ClimaECO Application Controller AC/S
  - KNX Security Panel GM/A
  - ABB Busch-ControlTouch® and Busch-VoiceControl®
- KNX devices communicating via IP
  - IP touch 7 / 10 LAN
  - PLC AC500 with integrated KNX interface (former BAC/S)





IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

#### Overview

2CDG 110 177 R0011	IP Interface	IPS/S 3.1.1
2CDG110204R0011	IP Interface Secure	IPS/S 3.5.1
2CDG 110 175 R0011	IP Router	IPR/S 3.1.1
2CDG 110 176 R0011	IP Router Secure	IPR/S 3.5.1



IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1



IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1



IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1



LAN (POE)

ABB
ON PRIS 3.5.1

ULAN / LINK

Telegram

ABB I-base FAX

IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1






## IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

#### **Further information**

- www.abb.com/KNX
  - Products and Downloads
    - → System Infrastructure and Interfacing
      - → IP Routers and Interfaces
  - Product information (manual, software, ...)
- Training & Qualification Database
  - https://go.abb/ba-training
- YouTube
  - Channel "ABB Home and Building Automation" https://www.youtube.com/user/ABBibusKNX
- KNX Association
  - https://secure.knx.org/






IP Router IPR/S 3.x.1 and IP Router Interface IPS/S 3.x.1

#### **Further information**

Training & Qualification Database: https://go.abb/ba-training

- The database contains extensive training content
  - Webinar, Learning Sessions, ... slides and videos
  - Video tutorials
  - and more ...
  - KNX Secure and ABB IP Interface Secure IPS/S 3.5.1, including detailed commissioning
    - →Link PDF →Link Video
  - KNX Secure and ABB IP Router Secure IPR/S 3.5.1; including detailed commissioning
    - → Link PDF → Link Video
  - IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 and IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1
    - →Link PDF →Link Video
  - Advanced features of IP devices: IP Router IPR/S 3.1.1 and IP Interface IPS/S 3.1.1
    - →Link PDF →Link Video





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