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CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

# **SECURITY Multiple Vulnerabilities in Symphony® Plus Historian**

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2020-24673, CVE-2020-24674, CVE-2020-24675, CVE-2020-24676, CVE-2020-24677, CVE-2020-24678, CVE-2020-24679, CVE-2020-24680

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## Purpose

ABB has a rigorous internal cybersecurity continuous improvement process which involves regular testing with industry leading tools and periodic assessments to identify potential product issues. Occasionally an issue is determined to be a design or coding flaw with implications that may impact product cybersecurity.

When a potential product vulnerability is identified or reported, ABB immediately initiates our vulnerability handling process. This entails validating the issue is in fact a product issue, identifying root causes, determining what related products may be impacted, developing a remediation, and notifying end users and ICS-CERT.

The resulting Cybersecurity Advisory intends to notify customers of the vulnerability and provide details on which products are impacted, how to mitigate the vulnerability or explain workarounds that minimize the potential risk much as possible. The release of a Cybersecurity Advisory should not be misconstrued as an affirmation or indication of an active threat or ongoing campaign targeting the products mentioned here. If ABB is aware of any specific threats it will be clearly mentioned in the communication.

The publication of this Cybersecurity Advisory is an example ABB's commitment to the user community in support of this critical topic. Responsible disclosure is an important element in the chain of trust we work to maintain with our many customers. The release of an Advisory provides timely information which is essential to help ensure our customers are fully informed. See details below.

## Affected products

ABB Ability™ Symphony® Plus:

- S+ Historian 3.0 and 3.1

## Summary

ABB has identified vulnerabilities in the product versions listed above. An update is available that resolves these vulnerabilities.

An attacker who successfully exploited one or more of these vulnerabilities could cause abuse the product functionality in various ways as described in the sections below.

## Recommended immediate actions

ABB advises all customers to review their installations to determine if they are using an impacted product as listed above, no further analysis or tools are needed to make this determination.

Users are advised to upgrade to S+ Historian 3.2.

End users who are unable to install this update should immediately look to implement the Mitigation and Workarounds listed below as this will significantly restrict an attacker's ability to compromise these installations.

S+ Historian version 3.0 and 3.1 are impacted by all the vulnerabilities contained in this announcement.

## Vulnerability severity

The severity assessment has been performed by using the FIRST Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) v3.1. The CVSS Environmental Score, which can affect the vulnerability severity, is not provided in this advisory since it reflects the potential impact of a vulnerability within the end-user organizations' computing environment; end-user organizations are therefore recommended to analyze their situation and specify the Environmental Score.

### **CVE-2020-24673 - SQL Injection**

CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 9.8 (Critical)  
CVSS v3.1 Temporal Score: 9.1 (Critical)  
CVSS v3.1 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C  
CVSS v3.1 Link: <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C>  
NVD Summary: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24673>

### **CVE-2020-24674 - Improper Authorization**

CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 8.8 (High)  
CVSS v3.1 Temporal Score: 8.4 (High)  
CVSS v3.1 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C  
CVSS v3.1 Link: <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C>  
NVD Summary: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24674>

### **CVE-2020-24675 - Weak Authentication**

CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 9.8 (Critical)  
CVSS v3.1 Temporal Score: 9.6 (Critical)  
CVSS v3.1 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:W/RC:C  
CVSS v3.1 Link: <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:W/RC:C>  
NVD Summary: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24675>

### **CVE-2020-24676 - Insecure Windows Services**

CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 7.8 (High)  
CVSS v3.1 Temporal Score: 7.2 (High)  
CVSS v3.1 Vector: AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O  
CVSS v3.1 Link: <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O>  
NVD Summary: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24676>

### **CVE-2020-24677 - Web Application Security**

CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 8.8 (High)  
CVSS v3.1 Temporal Score: 8.4 (High)  
CVSS v3.1 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C  
CVSS v3.1 Link: <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C>  
NVD Summary: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24677>

### **CVE-2020-24678 - Privilege Escalation**

CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 8.8 (High)  
CVSS v3.1 Temporal Score: 8.4 (High)  
CVSS v3.1 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C  
CVSS v3.1 Link: <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C>  
NVD Summary: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24678>

### **CVE-2020-24679 - Denial of Service**

CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 7.5 (High)  
CVSS v3.1 Temporal Score: 6.7 (Medium)  
CVSS v3.1 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:P/RL:O  
CVSS v3.1 Link: <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:P/RL:O/AR:H/MA:L>  
NVD Summary: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24679>

### **CVE-2020-24680 - Improper Credential Storage**

CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 7.0 (High)  
CVSS v3.1 Temporal Score: 7.0 (High)  
CVSS v3.1 Vector: AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:U/RC:C  
CVSS v3.1 Link: <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:U/RC:C>  
NVD Summary: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24680>

## **Vulnerability details**

ABB is aware that the S+ Historian 3.0 and 3.1 contains several vulnerabilities which require user attention:

#### **1. CVE-2020-24673 - SQL Injection**

A successful SQL injection exploit can read sensitive data from the database, modify database data (Insert/Update/Delete), execute administration operations on the database (such as shutdown the DBMS), recover the content of a given file present on the DBMS file system and in some cases issue commands to the operating system. This can lead to a loss of confidentiality and data integrity or even affect the product behavior and its availability.

#### **2. CVE-2020-24674 - Improper Authorization**

Not all S+ Historian commands correctly check user permission as expected. Authenticated but Unauthorized remote users could execute a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, execute arbitrary code, or obtain more privilege than intended on the machines.

#### **3. CVE-2020-24675 - Weak Authentication**

It is possible that an unauthenticated user could inject values to the History server or ultimately write values to the controlled process.

#### **4. CVE-2020-24676 - Insecure Windows Services**

Some services can be vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks. An unprivileged (but authenticated) user could execute arbitrary code and result in privilege escalation, depending on the user that the service runs as.

#### 5. **CVE-2020-24677 - Web Application Security**

Vulnerabilities in the S+ Historian web applications can lead to a possible code execution and privilege escalation, redirect the user somewhere else or download unwanted data.

#### 6. **CVE-2020-24678 - Privilege Escalation**

An authenticated user might execute malicious code under the user context and take control of the system. S+ Historian database is affected by multiple vulnerabilities such as the possibility to allow remote authenticated users to gain high privileges.

#### 7. **CVE-2020-24679 - Denial of Service**

A S+ Historian service is subject to a DoS under special crafted messages. An attacker might use this flaw to make it crash or even execute arbitrary code on the machine where the service is hosted.

#### 8. **CVE-2020-24680 - Improper Credential Storage**

The passwords of internal users (not Windows Users) are encrypted but improperly stored in a database.

## Mitigating factors

The vulnerabilities announced in this advisory for the S+ Historian require that an attacker has access to the system network and hosts which are generally expected to be protected.

S+ History is NOT recommended to be exposed directly to Internet connections. If S+ History is placed into a DMZ which is not properly configured, then S+ History Web Applications may be remotely exploitable via some of the vulnerabilities contained in this advisory.

To reduce the attack surface an important mitigation is to restrict network access. Methods for preventing unauthorized access to nodes on the system include but are not limited to the usage of IPsec (see "[2VAA007009-320 - S+ Historian 3.2 Installation and Administration user manual](#)") and by separating the S+ Historian network from other networks with firewalls.

Another mitigation against attack is to ensure that only authorized persons have access to user accounts on the system nodes and proper protections against malicious code (like antivirus, security patches, recommended settings in "[8VZZ001006T0001 - Symphony Plus Secure deployment guide for Windows 10 and Server 2016/2019](#)"...) are applied and periodically updated. This also includes any user accounts accessing the system via remote tools like Remote Desktop.

## Workarounds

Isolate the S+ Historian network from all external network connections.

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What is the scope of the vulnerability?

An attacker who successfully exploits the vulnerabilities listed may be able to modify plant historical data, alter reports and possibly configure the node to write process variables to the control system. Additionally, with escalated privileges the attacker could use the node to run arbitrary code and launch lateral attacks on other plant control system nodes.

## **What causes the vulnerability?**

The listed vulnerabilities are caused by unchecked buffer size or input data, improper storage of sensitive data or incorrect implementation of the authentication/authorization mechanism and more. See section “Vulnerability details” above.

## **What is the affected product?**

S+ Historian version 3.0 and 3.1.

## **What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do?**

An attacker who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities could prevent legitimate access to an affected system node, leading to a loss of its availability, or remotely cause an affected system node to stop. An attacker could also take control of the system, insert and run arbitrary code in a system node, gain higher privileges and obtain unauthorized access, leading to a loss of data confidentiality and integrity.

## **How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability?**

An attacker could try to exploit the vulnerabilities by creating a specially crafted message to the Symphony Plus Historian services or SQL database, executing arbitrary code, stealing sensitive data, or gaining higher privileges. This would require that the attacker has access to the system network, by connecting to the network either directly or through a wrongly configured or penetrated firewall, or that he installs malicious software on a system node or otherwise infects the network with malicious software. Recommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section “Mitigating factors” above.

## **Could the vulnerability be exploited remotely?**

Yes, S+ Historian Web Applications could expose functionality outside the local control system network. Further, some of the listed vulnerabilities can allow a remote authenticated attacker who has network access to escalate privileges, gain unauthorized access, and then use that to attempt lateral propagation to other control system nodes. Recommended practices include that process control systems are physically protected, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed.

## **What does the update do?**

The update removes the above listed vulnerabilities by modifying the way how S+ Historian validates messages, authenticates users, verifies input data, and checks permissions.

## **When this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed?**

No, ABB identified these vulnerabilities through internal testing and reviews.

## **When this security advisory was issued, had ABB received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited?**

No, ABB had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued.

# Support

For additional instructions and support please contact your local ABB service organization. For contact information, see [www.abb.com/contactcenters](http://www.abb.com/contactcenters).

Information about ABB's cybersecurity program and capabilities can be found at [www.abb.com/cyber-security](http://www.abb.com/cyber-security).

# Revisions

Rev.	Page (P) Chapt. (C)	Description	Date
A	all	New document	2020-12-14