



# **ABB NERC CIP v? SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP**

**August, 27 2015**



# AGENDA

- Reference to where we have been
- CIP Magicians
- Are you audit ready?
- How much evidence do you need?
  - Trust us approach
  - Trust and verify approach
  - Verified and demonstrated approach



# CIP V5 SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP

## Methodology

Developed and delivered a common framework and workflow to perform CIP V 5 Methodology

Addressed generation specific system segmentation approach, benefits and risks

## BES Systems

Developed and delivered a requirement mapping spreadsheet addressing numerous filtered approaches

Addressed impacts of ERC and BES Cyber System grouping strategy benefits and risks

## Low Impact

Developed and delivered an analysis spreadsheet with the differences between the V5 and V6 Lows as they stand in the process today

Addressed some of the current relevant activity impacting NERC CIP regulation

## Process Items

CIPv6 / v7 status update, ongoing SDT activity, RAI, Lessons Learned, RFI's, anticipated FERC response, and Transition Plan items

# CIP UPDATE (1)

## ○ CIP v6 NOPR

- Order likely this year
- CIP v6 Standards likely effective 4/1/16
- Comment period open through Sept 21
- Intention to direct changes to CIP-006-6 and standards activity on supply chain risk
- Questions on Remote access controls and vagueness of LERC definition

<https://www.sans.org/webcasts/cip-v6-nopr-about-100707>


<http://www.securingthehuman.org/blog/2015/07/23/to-nerc-cip-version-6-and-beyond>

<https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2015/071615/E-1.pdf>




## CIP UPDATE (2)

### Implementation Guidance



## CIP UPDATE (3)






# CIP MAGICIANS

**Turning a Medium Impact Generation Site Into a  
Site With Low Impact BES Cyber Systems**



# BIG PICTURE







# SEGMENTATION CONCEPT


- Generation aggregate of 1500MW or more
- Multiple units with shared cyber assets
- Segment to eliminate any shared cyber assets that could impact 1500MW or more
- May not be ideal at some facilities
- Needs to address Operations Level assets and Control Level assets




# DATA




# OPERATIONS SEGMENTS




# CONTROLLER LEVEL



# I/O LEVEL




# SHARED LOOP





# SEGMENTED LOOP



# COMPLETE?

- Segmentation complete
  - All analysis performed
  - Operational and leadership review to ensure no negative impact on safety, or reliability
  - New configuration tested
  - Outage scheduled
  - New design implemented
  - Up and running in new segmented architecture
- No worries until April 1, 2017..... Right?





ARE YOU AUDIT READY?

# WHAT IF YOUR AUDIT WAS APRIL 4, 2016

- Nothing but Lows on April 1, 2016
  - CIP-002-5.1
  - Attachment 1 Criteria 2.1 and 2.2
  - CIP-003-5 or 6
- Process Review
- Sample High, Medium, and Low
- Review adequacy of Low determinations



# WHAT IF YOUR AUDIT WAS APRIL 4, 2016

- Low determination by April 1, 2016



- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement a process that considers each of the following assets for purposes of parts 1.1 through 1.3: *[Violation Risk Factor: High][Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*
- i. Control Centers and backup Control Centers;
  - ii. Transmission stations and substations;
  - iii. Generation resources;
  - iv. Systems and facilities critical to system restoration, including Blackstart Resources and Cranking Paths and initial switching requirements;
  - v. Special Protection Systems that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System; and
  - vi. For Distribution Providers, Protection Systems specified in Applicability section 4.2.1 above.

# WHAT IF YOUR AUDIT WAS APRIL 4, 2016

- Low determination by April 1, 2016



**2.1.** Commissioned generation, by each group of generating units at a single plant location, with an aggregate highest rated net Real Power capability of the preceding 12 calendar months equal to or exceeding 1500 MW in a single Interconnection. For each group of generating units, the only BES Cyber Systems that meet this criterion are those shared BES Cyber Systems that could, within 15 minutes, adversely impact the reliable operation of any combination of units that in aggregate equal or exceed 1500 MW in a single Interconnection.



# WHAT IF YOUR AUDIT WAS APRIL 4, 2016

- Low determination by April 1, 2016



**R2.** The Responsible Entity shall: *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

**2.1** Review the identifications in Requirement R1 and its parts (and update them if there are changes identified) at least once every 15 calendar months, even if it has no identified items in Requirement R1, and

**2.2** Have its CIP Senior Manager or delegate approve the identifications required by Requirement R1 at least once every 15 calendar months, even if it has no identified items in Requirement R1.

# WHAT IF YOUR AUDIT WAS APRIL 4, 2016

- Low determination by April 1, 2016



R3. Each Responsible Entity shall identify a CIP Senior Manager by name and document any change within 30 calendar days of the change. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium]*  
*[Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

# NOW START AT THE END (THE RSAW)

**NERC**

NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC  
RELIABILITY CORPORATION

## Reliability Standard Audit Worksheet<sup>1</sup>

### CIP-002-5.1 — Cyber Security — BES Cyber System Categorization


*This section to be completed by the Compliance Enforcement Authority.*

**Audit ID:** Audit ID if available; or REG-NCRnnnnn-YYYYMMDD  
**Registered Entity:** Registered name of entity being audited  
**NCR Number:** NCRnnnnn  
**Compliance Enforcement Authority:** Region or NERC performing audit  
**Compliance Assessment Date(s)<sup>2</sup>:** Month DD, YYYY, to Month DD, YYYY  
**Compliance Monitoring Method:** [On-site Audit | Off-site Audit | Spot Check]  
**Names of Auditors:** Supplied by CEA

#### Applicability of Requirements

	BA	DP	GO	GOP	IA	LSE	PA	PSE	RC	RP	RSG	TO	TOP	TP	TSP
R1	X	X	X	X	X				X			X	X		
R2	X	X	X	X	X				X			X	X		

# PROCESS REVIEWS



# DATA REQUEST

- Provide the process implemented that considers R1 i through vi
- List of all assets considered including:
  - Identification (name, number, etc.) of the asset.
  - The type of asset (generation resource, substation, etc.).
  - An indication if there is a low impact BES Cyber System at the asset.

Asset Identification	Asset Type	Shared Asset	High Impact BES Cyber System	Medium Impact BES Cyber System	Low Impact BES Cyber System	Date of Commissioning	Date of De-commissioning
Big Gen 1	Generation Resource	No	No	No	Yes	1994	NA
Peaker Plant 2	Generation Resource	No	No	No	Yes	1980	NA
Super Sub 3	Transmission Substation	No	No	No	Yes	2000	NA
Little Sub 4	Control Center Backup Control Center Transmission Station <b>Transmission Substation</b> Generation Resource System Restoration Facility Special Protection System UFLS	No	No	No	Yes	2003	NA

# AUDITOR TASKS

- List Sampling
- For the sample of assets, provide:
  - Evidence that the process required by R1 was implemented to determine the list of assets containing low impact BES Cyber Systems
- Verify
  - ~~Process considers R1 i through vi~~
  - Ensures all assets of each type are considered
  - Process identifies and assigns correct HML
  - ~~CIP Senior Manager or delegate approval of HML~~ identified BES Cyber Systems







# HOW MUCH EVIDENCE DO YOU NEED?

Tell, Show, and Prove

## TRUST US APPROACH



Provide required R1 process document



Map R1 process documents for RSAW



Provide required asset list



Provide cyber asset identification process



Map cyber asset id process for RSAW



# TRUST AND VERIFY APPROACH



Everything from previous



Provide physical prints to show connectivity




Provide logical prints to show architecture



Provide functional analysis of operation



Provide analysis of 15 min and cyber asset impact



# VERIFIED AND DEMONSTRATED APPROACH



Everything from previous two



Network infrastructure artifacts reflecting connectivity (switch level)



Perimeter and host artifacts reflecting logical connectivity (Firewall and traffic level)



Control system artifacts of system operation (Tag, database, and display level)




Embedded device artifacts of performance (unavailability, degradation, and misuse)



# TOOLS FOR PROVING A NEGATIVE


Traffic Capture




Traffic Anomaly




Traffic DPI




Config Analysis



Firewall Rule



Switch Security



# PRESENTATION MATTERS

Tell

- RSAW Narrative response

Show

- Provide process documents and map to RSAW
- Provide prints that represent a condition

Prove

- Provide configuration data and captured artifacts that demonstrate a condition exists

Provide your evidence in a manner that is clear, do not try to drown the auditor with data and hope they determine you have no violations – **prove you have no violations!**





